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BANKS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
by Arthur S. Leonard

Banks lie on the new frontier of union organization -- the organization of
white collar workers. Although unions have generally been unsuccessful
in winning bank certification elections, they continue to exhibit interest
in what could be a lucrative field of organization. As a token of this interest, the AFL-CIO recently granted jurisdiction for bank organization to
the Office and Professional Workers International Union. Non-AFL-CIO
organizations such as the Teamsters and the Auto Workers have also demonstrated interest in bank organization.
In the following paper, Arthur Leonard summarizes the history of union organization in banks and considers the status of banks under the national
labor policy in two dimensions: (1) NLRB jurisdiction over banks under the
National Labor Relations Act, and (2) unit determination (the branch v. the
whole-bank unit).
The author traces the history of the inclusion of banks under the labor policy through a series of cases illuminating the meanings of "employer,"
"commerce," and "affecting commerce" in Section 2 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Then he considers the situation in regard to appropriate bargaining units. As noted in many sectors of the economy, unions
aim their organizing campaigns at the large, multi-plant operators, eschewing'small operations which are uneconomical to organize. So to in banks,
where unions have tried to make inroads in multi-branch banks through a
divide and conquer "Splinter Approach." The NLRB has considered branch
units to be appropriate for most of its history, but'a recent Circuit Court
ruling against the branch unit concept places the Board's approach in question. The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with this division of opinion.
Arthur Leonard is a junior in the New York State School of Industrial and
Labor Relations at Cornell University. -- Editor
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Introduction
The status of banks under the national labor policy, as interpreted and
applied by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal
courts, has acquired renewed importance in the 1970's due to the current
surge of white collar organization. Prior to the late 1960's, bank organization by labor unions was sporadic and small scale; unions were usually
unsuccessful in the few representation elections that were held.. 1 Until
the Banco Credito decision of 1968 (discussed in Part II, below) opened
the door to the splinter approach (i.e., sing1e branch bargaining units),
only a dozen banks in the entire country had entered into collective bargaining relationships with labor unions, and several of these were banks
2
controlled in whole or part by unions.
Quincy McPherson, in a 1969 study of bank unionization, attributes the
unions' lack of success in past efforts to the strategic approach taken by
them before 1960: "Their goal was to strive for a contract that would encompass the entire corporate organization below the management and supervisory levels." 3 Factors contributing to this policy's lack of success
include the character of sub-supervisory personnel in most banks,4 the
fringe benefits and employee welfare programs instituted by many banks,5
and the opposition of bank owners and managers to organization. 6 McPherson suggests that the most fruitful ground for union organization may be
the middle supervisory level, in view of the new organizational militance
of white collar workers. 7
McPherson's hypotheses are supported by the new strategic approach of
splintering adopted by labor unions contemplating bank organization. Early
in 1971, the AFL-CIO.granted official jurisdiction for banks to the Office
and Professional Employees International Union, a white collar organization,
rather than to one of the several industrial unions which have shown some
tnterest in banking, such as the Retail Clerks, the Communications Workers,
and the Boilermakers. 8 It should be noted that two non-AFL-CIO unions,
the Teamsters 9 and the Auto Workers, 1 0 have shown interest in bank organization.
As an indication of the increased pace of attempted organization, there were
only thirteen certification elections (and, incidentally, four successful decertification elections) from 1950 to 1963 (down from twenty-six during the,
1940's);i1 by contrast, the Office and Professional Employees alone participated in fifteen such elections during the first quarter of 1971.12
In light of this renewed interest in fank organization, we will explore two
areas of the status of banks under the national labor policy.
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In Part I, the question of jurisdiction will be discussed, tracing the
inclusion of banks under the labor policy from the first decision of
the NLRB through the last word in this area, NLRB v. Northern Trust
Company (1944). The subject is most interesting from a legal viewpoint in terms of the novel arguments advanced by banks to demonstrate that they are not engaged in "commerce" or are not "employers"
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
In Part II, the-vital strategic issue of appropriate bargaining units,
still not conclusively settled by the Supreme Court, will be discussed.
This is particularly timely due to the different positions currently held
by the First and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals; if organizing efforts
intensify to any considerable degree in the near future, it is likely
that the Supreme Court will have to resolve the conflict between the
Circuit Courts regarding the legality and appropriateness of the branch
unit as against the bank-wide unit.
Part I: The Status of Banks
The first labor unions in banks date from 1923, when union-owned
banks in Chicago and New York entered into collective agreements
with employee organizations. 13 McPherson, in his survey of bank
union history, found no further mention of bank unions until 1937,
by which time the Wagner Act (NLRB) had been in effect for two years.14
The NLRB was first called upon to decide the status of banks in 1939,
when the Board heard In the Matter of Bank of America... and United
Office and Professional Workers of America. 15 The case arose out of
a UOPWA organizing campaign in California's Bank of America, a federally chartered bank and trust company. In the course of organizing,
the bank discharged an employee who had joined the union and'was
known to have taken part in union work. The union filed charges under
Sections 8 (1) and 8 (3) of the old Wagner Act.
The bank responded by-filing a "special appearance" requesting dismissal of the charges on the grounds that the bank was not subject
to the national labor policy; Bank of America maintained that it was
not an "employer" within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Act, and
further that it was. not engaged in "commerce" or activities "affecting
commerce" within the statute's definitions contained in Sections 2 (6)
and 2 (7), respectively. 16
As these two arguments of the bank persist throughout the cases, the
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lines of )easoning of banks and courts will be followed through separately-lo their apparent conclusions 17

A. The Bank as "Employer"
An "employer" under the labor law is
any person acting (as an agent) of an employer, directly
or indirectly, but shall not include the United States
(or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank), or any State or political subdivision thereof... 18 (Phrases in parentheses were added
'
in 1947.)
On its face, this language includes all employers who are subject to
Congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution (an issue to bediscussed below) with the exception
of the government, government-owned corporations, Federal Reserve
Banks, and some other exceptions not relevant to this issue at hand.
When the NLRB was faced with Bank of America in 1939, the exceptions
of Federal Reserve Banks and wholly owned government corporations
were not spelled out, but might be inferred from the language of the
unamended statute.
The bank's claim to exemption from national labor policy was based
on the argument that sthe bank "is an instrumentality and agency of the
United States goverAment and, therefore, is not an employer" within
the statutory definition. 19 Supporting this contention, the bankcited
its membership in the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, its subjection to federal laws, rules, and regulations, and its status as depositary for United States funds and
agent for the government incertain financial transactions and policies.
The rejoinder of the NLRB to this argument was four-pronged: (1) the
bank is privately owned; (2) the bank's personnel policies, which are
most relevant to labor relations, are not decided or regulated by the
government; (3) the bank was not created by the government for its
own use; and (4) actions taken by the bank as an agent of the government are "purely incidental to its business, such as it might perform
ior any other person dealing with it." 2 1 The NLRB concluded that the
Bank of America was not the United States within the meaning of the
Act, and was thus an "employer" under Section 2(2).
The bank appealed this ruling to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.

In

20
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affirming the NLRB's holding, Circuit Judge Hetaly reiterated in summary form the NLRB reasoning, adding:
... It is true, also, that national banks may at times
be called upon as aids in carrying out the fiscal policies of the government, but their activities in these
respects are occasional and incidental to the private
purpose of the individuals who organize them. 2 2
The bank attempted further appeal, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1943, giving this NLRB policy decision the imprimatur of the
high court. 2 3
Bank of America is a "national bank," operating under federal regulation and charter. In NLRB v. Northern Trust Company, decided in the
Northern District Court of Illinois, District Judge Holly asserted the
jurisdiction of the NLRB over a state-chartered bank. 2 4 Surprisingly,
the Northern Trust Company did not directly advance its state charter
as a justification for exemption from national labor policy; instead,
the bank relied on a two-fold argument involving banking law and participation in the national banking system.
First, the bank maintained that participation in the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation exempted it
from regulation as 'an arm of the government -- virtually the same
argument unsuccessfully made by Bank of America. The bank's second
contention was more original; Northern Trust claimed that "the National Banking Act provides that no bank subject to the Act shall be
subject to any visitorial powers other than such as are authorized by
law... "25 !Since the NLRB has, under Section 9. of the Act, the power
to investigate-iorganizations under its jurisdiction for various purposes
specified by Congress, the bank was arguing that the anti-visitorial
provisions of the banking laws shielded it from NLRB jurisdiction.
In this case, the shield was intended to defend the bank from a subpoena requested by the NLRB to examine the bank's records and thus
to ascertain whether the bank was involved in interstate commerce.
Judge Holly bluntly struck down this new defensive strategy:
The argument does not impress me. Congress had made
the Act applicable to all employers... engaged in interstate commerce and has not excepted banks; ... bargain(ing) collectively with their employees does not interfere
with the conduct of the business of the bank any more
than would a voluntary agreement as to wages and hours.. 26
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Judge Holly went on to specifically bring up the state charter v. federal charter issue on his own, but he promptly demolished it by pointing out that numerous corporations with state charters were subject
to national labor policy due to the interstate nature of their businesses.
The major focus of this case is Judge Holly's ruling on the "commerce"
issue, which will be elaborated below.

27

Northern Trust did not appeal the District Court ruling, and further
research did not reveal any later cases dealing with this question,
so current standing of banks (both state and federal) wpuld seem to
be constant since Northern Trust was decided in 1944.
Before leaving this issue, it would do well to note the Taft-Hartley
amendments to Section 2 (2) in combination with developments in banking since 1947.
Most banks today are more deeply involved as agents of the government
(a category specifically exempted by Taft-Hartley) than they were in
1947. For example, banKs aid in the enforcement of fair housing laws
through their mortgage policies; they sellfood stamps in many parts of
the country; they frequently serve as distribution centers for Internal
Revenue forms; they send reports of savings account interest and other
transactions to the Internal Revenue Service; and they recently have
been required to report all large cash transactions to the Treasury Department. 2 8
On the other hand, the amendments of 1947 specifically add Federal
Reserve Banks to the list of exceptions. This addition tends to support the position of the NLRB; if Congress meant to exclude all banks,
it would have done so explicitly in 1947, rather than narrowly excluding just the Federal Reserve Banks (central banks) themselves.
In conclusion, it would seem that banks are still "employers" within
the meaning of Section 2 (2), even though they are deeply involved in
quasi-governmental functions as enforcers, distributors, and information reporters.
B. Banks and the Commerce Clause
"Commerce" is defined in Section 2(6) of the Act as "trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication among the several states.."29
This definition is unaltered in the amended form of the statute. The Act
further says (in Section 2 (7)), "The term 'affecting commerce' means in
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commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute btirden30
ing or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
On their faces, Sections 2 (6) and 2 (7) would seem to include bank
activities within their ambit as a matter of course. However, the
contention that banks are not engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act has been recurrent throughout the cases.
Bank of America advanced this contention in the first case discussed
above. 3 1 Unfortunately, the published opinion of the NLRB does not
disclose the full detail of the bank's argument. Reconstructing the
bank's reasoning from the NLRB's response, one might assume that
it contended that it did not deal in goods (a dictionary definition of
commerce), and certainly did not transport goods across state lines.
The Board is explicit and comprehensive, however, in explaining its
rationale for classifying Bank of America as both "in commerce" and
"affecting commerce" by its activities. The following list contains
some of the main bank activities cited by the Board in support of its
holding:
(1) transmits money from one part of the countiyzto
another by drawing drafts on correspondent banks in
other states;
(2) finances current business operations of customers
engaged in commerce;
(3) issues letters of credit and drafts which are instruments of commerce;
(4) finances travel through issuance of traveller's
checks and letters of credit;
32
(5) trades in foreign exchange, etc.
The Board summarized its argument as follows:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the commercial
bank.. .is the primarj medium in the commercial system... for the transfer of money credits from one portion of the country to another.. .whereby payment is
effected for goods.. .sold and transported...
Commerce without payment for the goods moved in
commerce would immediately fail. 3 3
The NLRB concluded that strikes or labor unrest of the type Congress
sought to reduce through the adoption of the Act would "obstruct commerce" if they occurred in the bank, thus providing a clear indication
that banks participate in "commerce" in the way Congress defined
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"commerce" in the Act.
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Upholding the Board on appeal, Circuit Judge Healy drew an a alogy
between the credit services of a bank and the power services of a
public utility:
The dependence of commerce upon the continuity of credit
furnished by these great banking institutions is as marked
as was its dependence upon the electric energy furnished
by the intra-state utilities involved in Consolidated Edison
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197. While credit services, considered
as aids to commerce, may be less tangible than is electric
current, for present purposes the differences would appear
to be immaterial. 3 5
Judge Healy further demonstrated that the bank's regular dealings with
its out-of-state conespondenit banks and customers involved it directly
in communication between the states, an activity specifically included
in the definition qf "commerce" provided in Section 2(6).36
The 9th Circuit decision was affirmed through Supreme Court denial of
certiorari, and was cited as precedent by the District Court of the District of Columbia in Reilly v. Millis, 13 LRRM 554, in its decision
that the City National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago was subject
to national labor policy.
The jurisdictional reach of the NLRB under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution is further extended with regard to banks in
NLRB v. Northern Trust. In this case, discussed above, the District
Court of the Northern District of Illinois granted a subpoena requested
by the NLRB under its Section 9(c) investigatory powers to examine the
records of Northern Trust to determine whether this state-chartered
bank met the definition of an employer "in commerce." The court went
further than granting the request; holding that virtually every bank is
involved in activities affecting interstate commerce, the Court rendered
its subpoena superfluous even as it was issued. 3 7 As authority for
this sweeping holding, Jedge Holly cited the opinion of Justice Frankfurter for the.Supreme Court in Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, which
had been issued just one month prior to the decision in Northern Trust. 3 8
Frankfurter's crucial argument says:
.Congress(,) in order to protect interstate commerce
irom .dverse effects of labor disputes(,) has undertaken
to regulate all conduct having such consequences that
constitutionally it can regulate. 3 9
Commenting on the wording of SeciOhs 2(6) and 2(7) and its implications,
Frankfurter said:
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... half a dozen enactments.. .are sufficient to illustrate that when (Congress) wants to bring aspects of
commerce within the full sweep of its constitutional
authority, it manifests its purpose by regulating not
only "commerce," but also matters which "affect,"
"interrupt," or "promote" interstate commerce. 4 0
Rejecting just the sort of hair-splitting arguments that had been advanced by the banks, Frankfurter commented:
When the conduct of -an enterprise affects commerce
among the States is a matter of practical judgment,
not to be determined by abstract notions .41
Applying Frankfurter's reasoning (which had involved a fraternal society's insurance fund) to the situation of Northern Trust, Holly said,
"The reasoning of the court. .. brings the ordinary business of a bank,
other perhaps than a very small local bank, within the meaning of the
term interstate commerce. "42
Northern Trust seems to be the last word on the status of banks in regard
to the Commerce Clause and the labor policy. One might add, as a final
comment, that Judge Holly's exception of "very small local" banks is
probably no longer valid, due to the wider construction afforded the Commerce Clause in more recent cases (particularly in the Civil Rights area),
the increased mobility of the American lifestyle, and the interstate character of most corporations doing business with banks, all of which combine
to make interstate transactions an integral part of the operations of the
bank, no matter how large or small.
The first part of this paper has examined the case history of NLRB jurisdiction over banks. Typical bank defenses against being included within
the jurisdiction of national labor policy have been examined, and the
reasoning of the Courts in striking down these defenses has been presented. Now that we have established the liability of banks to being
organized by labor unions, we move on the examine the crucial strategic
issue of how that organization is to be attempted by unions -- the issue
of unit determination.
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Part II: The Appropriate Unit for Bargaining
During the 1960's, unions interested in bank organization adopted a
strategy called the 'splinter approach." Convinced.by their experiences
of the 1950's that elections in bank-wide units were exercises in futility, unions concentrated their efforts on organizing in branch banks or
specific departments in central offices.
The first case to deal with this new strategy is referred to in Board
Member Kennedy's dissent in Bank of America and Union; 4 3 Kennedy
cites the Board's unpublished ruling in Bank of California, decided in
1960.44 In that case, the NLRB turned down the union's application
for a branch unit; the Board found centralized administrative and personnel functions, including personnel transfer, hiring, wage determination, retirement, and vlfare plans to be controlling factors. 4 5
However, with the emergence of the new "Kennedy Board" in the early
1960's, a drastic change took place in the Board's policy. The NLRB,
in deciding unit questions, returned to the policies expressed in the
earliest case in this area, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (1945).46' In
Banco Popular, a branch unit was found appropriate based on history
of organization (the union had only organized in one branch) and the
geographical isolation of the branch. A key point in the decision is
the Board's statement that a bank-wide unit is always appropriate,
but is not necessarily the only appropriate unit. This reasoning was
to recur in the 1960's, when the Board would even acknowledge the
dual "appropriateness" of larger and smaller units within the same
large bank. 4 7
The NLRB reversed the Bank of California holding in Banco Credito y
Ahorro Ponceno. 4 8 This decision, affirmed by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals in 1968, expands on the limited statement in Banco Popular, offering a specific list of reasons for acknowledging the appropriateness of a branch unit:
(1) Branch managers ... supervise employees on a
day-to-day basis, recommend ... pay increases,

promotions, tiansfers, aiscipline, and discharge;
(2) Branch managers... expldin.. .new policies to
employees;
... assign overtime work;
(4) ... establish vacation scneduies;

(5) ... resolve minor employee grievances.

(Also,)

(6) ... (note the) relative remoteness of branch...;
(7) ... (and) almost complete absence of interchange

p
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of personnel between (branch) and other parts of the
system. 4 9
This list of personnel functions and characteristics was adjudged by
both the NLRB and the Court to be more important in making the unit
determination than the acknowledged centralized administration,
"uniform policies and standards, and corresponding lack of authority
in local branch-managers." 5 0
In making this decision, the Court explicitly articulated the implicit
logic of Banco Popular:
The Bank.. .cannot succeed only by demonstrating
that a system-wide unit would be appropriate but
must also show that a branch unit is clearly not
appropriate. 5 1
The Court cited the "broad discretion... (of) the Board, the limited
scope of review, (and) the Act's policy of assur4ng freedom to employees... to organize" as reasons for upholding the Board's original ruling.
McPherson; discussing the legal situation in his 1969 study, claims
the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari "established the
splintering approach as a workable method for union organizers seeking to establish a significant foothold in the nation's banks." 5 3 The
NLRB seemed to take the First Circuit decision and the Supreme Court
silence as expressing approval in principle for the branch unit concept, and the Board has continued in four major cases to apply and
broaden the concept of splintering.
In Bank of America- and Lithographers Union (1969), the Board sanctioned a unit of lithographic and other graphic'employees in one department of the bank's centralized service facility. 5 4 The community
of interest of the employees was considered more important than the
functional integration of the bank; moreover, since the unitin question was housed in the same building as other bank departments, the
Board had reduced its list ofcriteria by one ("relative remoteness" of
unit).
In Wells Fargo and UPEIU (1969), the Board narrowed the Bank of
America holding slightly by refusing to establish a unit in a service
department which had considerable interchange and contact with
uther departments in the same Duilding. However, in the same decision the Board recognized a branch unit even though it acknowledged the "appropriateness"of regional and divisional units which
would be of an intermediatesize between that of the branch and a
bank-wide unit. 5 5 Once again, the basic thrust of the Board's
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reasoning was that where there were several appropriate units, the
one requested by the employees or their organization would be favored
over the one sought by the bank.
In Wayne Oaland Bank (1971), the NLRB routinely applied similar
criteria and ecognized several branches, a drive-in facility, a loan
department, and a main office as distinct and appropriate units. 5 6
This was certainly an expansion of the previous decisions, as the
loan office, main office, and drive-in facility were geographically
connected.
In Bank of America and Union of Employees (1972), the Board once
more recognized a branch unit, severing out trust department employees who were present iti the branch. 5 7 There was a crubial difference
in this case, however. For the first time, a member of the Board submitted a vigorous dissent showing remarkable prescience, for just a
month later Wayne Oakland was overturned by the Sixth Circuit on
appeal by the bank. 5 8
Kennedy's dissent in Bank of America recalls the unpublished Bank of
California decision of 1960.59 In that decision, the Board found central ized administration and functional integration of the bank's personnel policies to be overriding factors in denying a union's branch unit
request.
Kennedy argued for a re-establishment of the Bank of California holding
by citing an early "Kennedy Board" decision (1962) in which the Board
had defined a "two-fold objective" in determining units:
(1) ... giving employees freedom of choice and

(2) in a group which has a 'direct relevancy to the
circumstances within which collective bargaining
is to take place. For, if the unit determination
fails to relate to the factual situation with which
the parties must deal, efficient and stable collective bargaining is undermined rather than fostered.'60
Kennedy focuses his attention on the second 'fold,' pdnting out that
the branch manager does not have authority to negotiate many of the
"mandatory" subjects ol bargaining. Arguing for a regional unit (reaions of Bank of America consist of several districts, each containing
several branches), Kennedy points out:
It is the district branch administrators who work
under the regional vice president who ensure that
the Employer's operational and personnel policies
are enforced. They are the persons vested with
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authority to vary policies.

61

In arguing for a unit of intermediate size in this large bank, Kennedy
sought to strike a compromise between the branch unit (which would
meet the first objective of the Board) and the bank-wide unit (which
would meet the second). In reversing Wayne Oakland, the Sixth Circuit Court went a step further by implicitly asserting that a maximization of the second objective would result in a maximization of the
first. By establishing a unit most effective for the 'factual situation,'
implied the Court, the Section 7 rights of employees to be represented
collectively would be most fully realized.
In this connection, Circuit Judge Kent focused on centralized control
of labor policy in his decision for the Court. 6 2 He quoted liberally
from the report of the NLRB's regional director to provide evidence that
a bank-wide unit in Wayne Oakland would comport best with the 'factual situation.'
The Director also found with respect to personnel policies:
"...substantially

all... employees work common hours...

Wage levels and fringe benefits are centrally determined
and administered. All hiring...is done by the central Personnel Department... Newly hired personnel are not hired
for a specific location, but are assigned to the main office
during.. .training...* 6 3
Judge Kent left some hope for the splinter strategy when he distinguished the Wayne Oakland situation from Banco Credito by pointing
to the geographic closeness of Wayne Oakland's branches and the
significantly higher degree of interchange among branch personnel in
the Wa~e bakland Bank. 6 4 In a brief dissent, Circuit Judge Edwards
noted the wide discretion allowed the NLRB under the Act and added
that he was convinced by the factual evidence presented by the Board
that its decision was supported by the evidence. 6 5
What is the current law regarding appropriate units in banks? The
Wayne Oakland and Banco Credito decisions by two different Circuit
Courts of Appeals have not yet been resolved or collated through
dual affirmation (and differentiation) by the Supreme Court as of this
w'rit!ng. Banco Credito was derted certiorari, however, thus retaining some stamp of higher approval than Wayne Oakland, at least within
the confines of the First Circuit.
Reporting Wayne Oakland, the Amer'ran Bankers Association's publi-
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cation, Banking, saw the decision as evidence of a new trend toward
"multiunits. " Quoting,from a speech by NLRB Chairman Edward B.
Miller to a banker gathering, Banking set forth the following criteria
for unit determination:
... We look to see whether there is regular and
frequent interchange of employees as among the
several branch banks;

... how much autonomy

and authority is afforded to the local manager;
... the geographical spread... If we find very
little authority, very extensive interchange and
not too great a geographical spread..., we are
more likely to insist upon a grouping of branches.

66

One might view the different rulings of the Circuit Courts in two different ways. First, one might assert that there is no conflict between
the two, because of the reasons set forth by Judge Kent and because
of the difference in size a~d scope of Bank of America and Wayne Oakland Bank. On the other hand, one could see an essential conflict
between a maximization of employee freedom to determine the unit
they want to be organized in and the discretion of the Board or Courts
in deciding which of several seemingly appropriate units is subjectively more efficient for collective bargaining.
If the Supreme Court were to take the latter view, it might decide with
Judge Kennedy that an intermediate unit is the answer to the problem
of balancing employee freedom against unit functionalism. In the case
of a large operation like Bank of America or Wells Fargo, such a unit
might be a region or district composed of several branches., In the
case of a smaller bank, such as Wayne Oakland (with eleven branches
and two other clearly distinct facilities), there might be one or more
units consisting of several branches, such as a unit of suburban branches, a unit of urban branches, and a unit of the main office and
drive-in facility. The Court might even decide that banks with less
than some given number of branches would be granted bank-wide units
for reasons of practicality or convenience. This is, however, mere
speculation; the Supreme Court might be persuaded to go to one extreme or the other, recognizing branch units where they are most practical and bank-wide units where they seem more efficient in an affiriation of Tudge Kent's reasoning in his differentiation of Wayne Oakland from Banco Credito. The Supreme Court may even decide to leave
the unit decision completely to the discretion of the NLRB, thus tacitly
reaffirming the Banco Credito policy currently pursued by the Board.
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If the NLRB modifies its approach to conform to
ruling in future cases, there will be no higher court test unless unions
decide to pursue a test case (as the banks did in Wayne Oakland.) If
the NLRB continues on its present course (the Banco Credito Approach),
bank appeals may bring an eventual Supreme Court test. At this writing, the Board has not denied a branch unit request since Bank of
California in 1960.
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